Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my full

statement be made a part of the record——

Just make a couple of points.

We know that Sergei Stepashin has now been elevated to the

post of prime minister, and I think it bears remembering that he

is one of the chief architects of the Chechen War, which I and

many others roundly criticized, and unfortunately, there were some

within the State Department, and even our Vice President, who

compared it to the civil war in this country, which I think was a

very, very farfetched and misguided perspective to obtain.

As a matter of fact, at that time—and this isn’t a partisan dig,

and I think you know the earlier comments, not by my friend from

California, but by my friend from Connecticut, I think it is very unfortunate

to take the chairman’s opening comments, which I think

were very well thought out, and to reduce heartfelt and profound

disagreements about our Kosovo policy and policies vis-a-vis Russia,

and to reduce them to petty partisanship, I think does a disservice

to honest disagreements.

I think we need to engage in those disagreements where they

manifest themselves, in an unfettered way, knowing that where

possible—and I underscore ‘‘where possible’’—there ought to be a

bipartisanship in our foreign policy. But to do so artificially, I think

sets itself up to a policy that is not sustainable.

I think with our Kosovo policy there are very real problems with

that policy. I find it absolutely staggering and disconcerting that

there was no plan, and apparently there is no plan now for the

820- to 850,000 internally displaced Kosovar-Albanians who languish

and potentially are dying, but certainly are at grave risk inside

of Kosovo. I know because I have asked from the top, Wesley

Clark on down, what was the plan. If we initiate bombing, where

was the fire wall to protect the Kosovar-Albanians, and there was

no plan, and there is no plan today.

The thought was that Slobodan Milosevic would blink early on.

The idea was to bomb for 2 days, then pause and find a peace. Regrettably,

the dictatorship has shown some resiliency and has not

blinked.

I think it is wrong and misguided to criticize the Chairman and

to reduce his comments to petty partisanship, because it is not.

There are real differences.

There are also, as Mr. Leach pointed out, some very profound implications,

however unwitting, that could manifest themselves in

the PRC, as well as in Russia. We are now, and we have had hearings

on the Helsinki Commission just recently. We are driving a

whole generation of people who haven’t made up their mind yet

about NATO in the West into the hands of the ultranationalists,

and that is very, very grave. I think we need to consider the implications

as we go into the year 2000.

I would be happy to yield to my friend.

Mr. Chairman, could I have my time——

The point—and I don’t know what the exact word

was, something about the Speaker and that he was slinking in and

voting yes. The distinguished Speaker is a totally honorable man.

I know that I was never contacted and told, you must vote this way

or that; it was a vote of conscience.

Mr. Campbell, while I disagreed with his approach, I respected

him enormously that he felt that the War Powers Act was triggered

by this and there ought to be an up-or-down vote on this very important

engagement. As we are seeing now, it is enlarging even at

a time when the Russians are indicating Chernomyrdin and others

are trying to perhaps put something together; and perhaps our Ambassador

can shed some light on that.

We are enhancing the bombing, and maybe that is part of the

strategy, I don’t know, but I assume goodwill until shown otherwise,

and I assume it of all parties.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I, too, believe like Mr. Leach—your statement

about anti-Americanism in Russia is less about us and more about

them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style institutions and,

above all, democracy. Looked at from this angle, the problem is actually

a little less hopeless. But from my mind, I think it is a little

more hopeless. I say that because whether or not we are liked, liking

someone and liking a country collectively may be good on the

short term. Popularity should be fifth on the listing of priorities. I

am concerned there are very few benign dictatorships out there

that, if they move increasingly toward fascism or ultranationalism

or back to communism, which the Duma certainly has indicated

they are capable of doing, at home that means more human rights

abuses in the future and more aggressive foreign policy. So that

makes me more pessimistic, not less. Again, whether or not they

like us or not is less important to me than anything else, especially

those other points.

I do have a few questions. Sergei Stepashin, as I pointed out earlier,

one of the main architects of the Chechnyan war obviously

now has been raised to Prime Minister, as we have all noted. What

impact, in your view, will that have realistically on Russian policy?

It may have been a move obviously to divert attention or perhaps

bring down the Duma if they fail in confirming him after three attempts,

but what move will that have vis-a-vis Kosovo?

Second, in China, Russian Representative Victor Chernomyrdin

has said there needs to be an unconditional halt to NATO bombing

before anything relative to peace moves forward. What is the Administration’s

response to that? Has Ambassador Collins sought to

address the domestic audience in Russia on Russian television or

in any other way, or try to give the NATO/U.S. side of things

there? If you could, respond briefly to that.

Finally, in terms of the resolution Mr. Gejdenson offered on the

floor several days ago, was that something that emanated from the

White House or the State Department? To my mind, it was an

after-the-fact confirmation or negation of the policy. Whose idea

was it?It seems to me it was a very high-risk strategy. Frankly,

Ithink ambiguity would have been the more preferable course to

take because many of us had profound misgivings about this policy.

But we were hoping it would end tomorrow, and in no way, shape

or form did any of us want to convey to Milosevic or any of his cronies

that the House was so divided. Yet this high-risk strategy was

pursued. Where did that come from?

Again, I have heard that stated a few times about the

Whip, the Whip and the slinking in of the distinguished Speaker

of the House. Again, you belittle our profound misgivings. I am one

of those who follows this and has followed it ever since the beginning

of the war in Slovenia when Croatia was under attack. I remember

reporting to Brent Scowcroft and speaking to him and the

NSC people about my visit to Vukovar and Osjek when they were

under siege. So I have a long-standing concern about this. To belittle

that is—somehow the Whip is saying, this was the political

vote; it was not. It was a profound disagreement with the Administration

and how they were pursuing their policy.

Again, I think you do us a great disservice when you keep saying

that. I hope you would rethink your strategy, because this is not

a political issue. This is an issue of profound differences, and the

outcome—as we are seeing, the miscalculations that have been

made are leading to a disastrous outcome. You keep bringing this

up. My question really wasn’t about the language, it was about the

strategy.

Whose idea was it to go forward with this, Mr. Ambassador?

I know I am over my time, but the original bombing

strategy called for two days and a pause. I mean, we had an opportunity

during Easter celebration—you had the Pope, eight cardinals,

a cross-section of religious leaders saying, here is a pause

opportunity to try to make peace work. Isn’t this an opportunity

right now?

But he doesn’t care—the degrading even of his military.

As long as his life and his power stay intact, the concern is

that he will allow others to do the dying. The Kosovar Albanians,

850,000 strong, inside of Kosovo at grave risk, they are my highest

concern, and we are not reaching them.

Thank you.